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A large family of quantum weak coin-flipping protocols
Carlos Mochon∗
Institute for Quantum Information, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA
(Dated: December 25, 2005)
Each classical public-coin protocol for coin flipping is naturally associated with a quantum protocol
for weak coin flipping. The quantum protocol is obtained by replacing classical randomness with
quantum entanglement and by adding a cheat detection test in the last round that verifies the
integrity of this entanglement. The set of such protocols defines a family which contains the protocol
with bias 0.192 previously found by the author, as well as protocols with bias as low as 1/6 described
herein. The family is analyzed by identifying a set of optimal protocols for every number of messages.
In the end, tight lower bounds for the bias are obtained which prove that 1/6 is optimal for all
protocols within the family.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum weak coin flipping is a two party quantum
protocol for agreeing on a random classical bit, where
Alice wants outcome zero and Bob wants outcome one.
Its main constraint is that a cheating player should not
be able to bias the coin in their favor by more than some
parameter ǫ.
Previous work by the same author [1] has shown that
there exists a quantum weak coin-flipping protocol with
bias ǫ = 0.192, that is, such that neither player can win
by cheating with a probability greater than 0.692. The
protocol with bias 0.192 was a generalization of the one
by Spekkens and Rudolph [2] which achieved a bias of
1/
√
2 − 1/2 ≃ 0.207. Both belong to a large family of
quantum weak coin-flipping protocols that are based on
a set of classical games involving public coins.
The purpose of this paper is to study this large fam-
ily of protocols for quantum weak coin flipping. In par-
ticular, we will prove that the optimal protocol in this
family has a bias of 1/6, though such a bias can only be
reached in the limit of arbitrarily large messages. Be-
cause our lower bound analysis is constructive, we shall
give explicit descriptions of protocols with biases that are
arbitrarily close to 1/6.
The protocols with bias of 1/
√
2 − 1/2 was originally
described in Ref. [2] as part of a different family of pro-
tocols for quantum weak coin flipping, all of which in-
volved three messages. Lower bounds for this family
were obtained by Ambainis [3], which proved that the
ǫ = 1/
√
2 − 1/2 protocol was optimal within the family.
Though our family does not contain every protocol in the
Spekkens and Rudolph family, it does contain its optimal
protocol.
The best lower bound currently known that applies to
all weak coin-flipping protocols is by Ambainis [4] and
states that the number of messages must grow at least
as Ω(log log 1ǫ ). Ambainis’ result rules out attaining an
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arbitrarily small bias with a fixed number of messages,
thus the importance of looking at protocols with arbi-
trarily large number of messages. We believe that our
result is the first of its kind in lower bounding the bias of
a large family of protocols that includes instances with
every number of messages.
Other important work related to quantum weak coin
flipping includes Refs. [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] among others.
Also related are the results on quantum strong coin flip-
ping (a variant where ideally neither player should be
allowed to bias the coin in either direction). The best
known protocol for strong coin flipping has a bias of 1/4
[4, 7] whereas Kitaev [11] has proven a lower bound of
1/
√
2− 1/2 for the optimal bias.
Before proceeding we shall give a working definition
of quantum weak coin flipping as a quantum communi-
cation protocol where two parties (Alice and Bob) start
off unentangled and then exchange a series of sequential
quantum messages after which they must each output a
single classical bit. Their outputs are required to satisfy
the following constraints
• If Alice and Bob both follow the protocol their out-
puts must always agree. Furthermore, the prob-
ability that Alice wins (i.e., both parties output
zero) is given by PA whereas the probability that
Bob wins (i.e., both parties output one) is given by
PB = 1− PA.
• If Alice is honest (i.e., follows the protocol), then
independent of Bob’s actions, Alice will not output
one with a probability greater than P ∗B.
• Similarly, if Bob is honest and Alice is dishonest,
Bob will not output zero with a probability greater
than P ∗A.
The only security assumption for the above protocol is
that a cheating player cannot directly affect the qubits in
their opponent’s laboratory; that is, we desire protocols
with information-theoretic security.
The parameters PA, P
∗
A and P
∗
B will be used to describe
a coin-flipping protocol. Obviously, we’d like to make P ∗A
and P ∗B as small as possible. For simplicity, the merit of
2a coin-flipping protocol is often quoted by specifying the
bias ǫ = max(P ∗A, P
∗
B)− 1/2.
Note that whereas the usual definition of coin flipping
requires PA = PB = 1/2, we will allow in this paper any
value of PA ∈ [0, 1]. This will allow us to derive a set of
tradeoff curves for P ∗A versus P
∗
B.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
describes some of our notation concerning tree variables,
and will introduce the theorem relating classical coin
games to quantum protocols for weak coin flipping. The
theorem, which is a generalization of the work in Ref. [1],
is proven in Appendix A. Though the full description of
the quantum protocol is only given in the appendix, a
brief description is presented at the end of Sec. II.
The main new results of the paper are presented in
the two subsequent sections: the proof of lower bounds
for the bias in Sec. III and the description of matching
protocols in Sec. IV.
We also include in Appendix B an analytic derivation
of the bias ǫ = 0.192 of Ref. [1] which was originally found
using numerical techniques. Though the result itself has
been superseded by the protocols with bias 1/6, we in-
clude the derivation because it uses a fairly different set
of techniques that could potentially be useful elsewhere.
II. NOTATION
Throughout this paper we shall make ample use of bi-
nary trees. All trees henceforth will be composed exclu-
sively of binary nodes and leaves, and the leaves will all
be located at the same depth.
The nodes of a tree will be labeled by binary strings
so that the leftmost node at depth k gets labeled by k
zeroes, and the rest will equal one plus the binary value
of the node to their left (keeping the number of digits
constant). The root node will be denoted by the letter
r, which will behave as the empty string so that x = r
implies x0 = 0 and x1 = 1. With these conventions the
left descendant of node x is x0 and the right descendant
is x1. We define |x| as the length of the binary string x,
which also corresponds to the depth of node x.
In this paper we shall use calligraphic fonts, such as
G, to denote an assignment of a number or expression
to each node of a binary tree. Given an assignment G,
the value of node x will be Gx. Most of our notation
is summarized by Fig. 1. Note that, though we shall
always be working with trees of fixed finite depth, we
shall usually leave the depth implicit.
We define an n-Coin-Game as an assignment G to a
depth n binary tree such that Gx ∈ [0, 1] for all x and
Gx ∈ {0, 1} for all leaves (i.e., for all x such that |x| = n).
To each n-Coin-Game, G, we can associate a classical
n-message public-coin coin-flipping protocol as follows:
The state of the protocol at each step will be described
by a node in the tree, and this information will be kept by
both Alice and Bob. The game begins at the root node
and proceeds downward until reaching a leaf node. If the
Gr
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FIG. 1: A depth 3 binary tree.
current node x is a binary node of even depth, then Alice
chooses which path to follow and announces the choice
to Bob. This is done probabilistically, by announcing
the outcome of a public coin with bias Gx, so that Alice
chooses the left path with probability Gx and the right
path with probability 1−Gx. The same mechanism occurs
at odd binary nodes, except that Bob is responsible for
choosing the direction and announcing it to Alice. The
game ends when arriving at a leaf node x, in which case
Alice wins if Gx = 0 and Bob wins if Gx = 1.
Note that we do not require that the coin-flip be fair
when both Alice and Bob are honest. Given an n-Coin-
Game G, we can define H on a tree of the same depth by
the equations:
Hx =
{
Gx if |x| = n,
GxHx0 + (1− Gx)Hx1 if |x| < n.
(1)
The value ofHx indicates the conditional probability that
Bob would win given that the game arrived at node x,
assuming both players play honestly. The value of Hr is
Bob’s probability of winning for an honest game, which
is clearly bounded between 0 and 1.
For each n-Coin-Game G, we also define A and B on a
tree of the same depth by the equations:
Ax =


1− Gx for |x| = n,
GxA2x0 + (1− Gx)A2x1 |x| even, |x| < n,
Gx
√Ax0 + (1− Gx)
√Ax1 |x| odd, |x| < n,
Bx =


Gx for |x| = n,
Gx
√Bx0 + (1 − Gx)
√Bx1 |x| even, |x| < n,
GxB2x0 + (1 − Gx)B2x1 |x| odd, |x| < n.
(2)
The importance of these quantities is given by the fol-
lowing theorem:
Theorem 1. For each n-Coin-Game, G, there exists an
(n+1)-message quantum weak coin-flipping protocol such
that
PAP
∗
A = Ar, (3)
PBP
∗
B = B2r , (4)
3and the honest probabilities of winning are
PA = (1 − PB) = (1−Hr), (5)
where A, B and H are defined in terms of G by Eqs. (1,2).
The quantum protocol
In this section we shall give a brief approximate de-
scription of the quantum protocol, which should provide
the needed intuition. The full description of the protocol
is contained in Appendix A along with the proof of the
above theorem. A simpler version of the protocol also
appears in Ref. [1].
The basic idea is to take the classical public-coin pro-
tocol associated with an n-Coin-Game, G, replace the
classical randomness with quantum entanglement, and
then add a cheat detection step.
Classical shared randomness can be replaced by quan-
tum entanglement using states of the form
√
a|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+√1− a|1〉 ⊗ |1〉, (6)
where one qubit belongs to Alice and one to Bob. The
randomness can be extracted at any time by measuring
both qubits in the computational basis.
In the classical protocol associated with G described
above, Alice and Bob slowly built up a shared random
string. After the first k messages they shared a random k-
bit string, where string x has probability Px (the formal
definition of P is given in Eq. (A10)). The quantum
protocol is constructed so that, after k messages, Alice
and Bob share the state
|ψk〉 =
∑
x
|x|=k
√
Px|x〉 ⊗ |x〉. (7)
In the classical protocol, the sender of the message (Alice
for odd messages and Bob for even messages) has control
over its content and hence the ability to cheat at that
step, whereas the other player has no control over the
given step. In the quantum protocol the same structure
is maintained. The basic step to go from a k-bit string to
a k+1-bit string is for the message sender to append two
qubits in the zero state, then apply a controlled unitary
on the two qubits with the other k bits as control, and
finally to send one of the qubits to the other player:
|ψk〉 −→ |ψk〉 ⊗ |00〉 (8)
−→
∑
x
|x|=k
√
Px|x〉A ⊗ |x〉B
⊗
(√
Gx|00〉+
√
1− Gx|11〉
)
−→
∑
x
|x|=k
∑
i∈{0,1}
√
Pxi|xi〉A ⊗ |xi〉B = |ψk+1〉.
After n messages, at the end of the classical protocol,
Alice and Bob share an n-bit string, which determines
the coin outcome based on the value of the corresponding
leaf of G. In the quantum protocol, they do the equiv-
alent measurement, but using a two outcome POVM so
that most of the entanglement is preserved after the mea-
surement. This allows a cheat detection step to be ap-
pended to the end of the protocol as follows: the winner
of the coin-flip based on the POVM must send over all
of their qubits to the other player for inspection. The
other player will end up with a pure state and can do
a projection onto the final state and its complement. If
the latter result is obtained, then cheating is detected
and the losing player can declare victory, otherwise that
player acknowledges defeat. In either case, the first player
always declares victory.
Note that, though it is possible for both players to
declare victory at the same time, this can only occur if
one of them was cheating, and in such cases we always
expect the cheating player to declare victory anyway.
The rest of this paper contains the analysis of the fam-
ily of protocols, which will identify the protocol with bias
of 1/6 and prove that it is optimal within the family.
III. LOWER BOUNDS ON THE BIAS
In this section we shall derive lower bounds for the set
of P ∗A and P
∗
B that can be achieved with quantum proto-
cols based on n-Coin-Games as defined in Theorem 1.
Definition 2. For n ∈ Z+, define the set Λn ⊂ R2 so
that (A,B) ∈ Λn if and only if there exists an n-Coin-
Game, G, with A = Ar and B = Br and A and B defined
in terms of G by Eq. (2).
For each (A,B) ∈ Λn there exists an (n + 1)-message
quantum coin-flipping protocol such that PAP
∗
A = A
and PBP
∗
B = B
2. Furthermore, if (PAP
∗
A,
√
PBP ∗B) /∈
Λn then there is no protocol built out of a n-Coin-
Game that achieves PA, P
∗
A and P
∗
B . However, it is
not true that (PAP
∗
A,
√
PBP ∗B) ∈ Λn implies the exis-
tence of a protocol with those parameters. For example,
(0.3531,
√
0.3531) ∈ Λ2 because there exists a 3-message
protocol with PA ≃ 0.515, P ∗A ≃ 0.686, P ∗B ≃ 0.728, how-
ever there are no 3-message protocols with PA = PB =
1/2 and P ∗A = P
∗
B ≃ 2 ∗ 0.353 = 0.706. The optimal sym-
metric 3-message protocol is the one by Spekkens and
Rudolph [2] with P ∗A = P
∗
B = 1/
√
2 = 0.707. Though it
would be preferable to study the set of achievable triplets
(Ar,Br,Hr), the sets Λn are easier to analyze and in the
limit n→∞ will provide us with interesting bounds.
We begin the study of the sets Λn by showing that
they can be obtained inductively:
Lemma 3. The set Λn is the convex combination of pairs
of points from the set {(B2,
√
A) | (A,B) ∈ Λn−1}.
Proof. Given an n-Coin-Game, G, define the variable γ ≡
Gr ∈ [0, 1] and the two (n− 1)-Coin-Games G(0) and G(1)
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FIG. 2: The curve (t2,
√
1− t) for t ∈ [0, 1]. The convex hull
of the curve is the region Λ2, with the dashed line serving as
lower boundary.
by
G(i)x =
{
1− Gix for |x| = n− 1,
Gix for |x| < n− 1,
(9)
for i = 0, 1. There is a natural isomorphism between G
and the triplet γ,G(0),G(1).
Furthermore define A(i) and B(i) in terms of G(i) in
the usual way. Note that A(i) and B(i) are not the left
and right branches of A and B defined from G but rather
A(i)x = Bix and B(i)x = Aix. Therefore
Ar = γ
(
B(0)r
)2
+ (1 − γ)
(
B(1)r
)2
, (10)
Br = γ
√
A(0)r + (1 − γ)
√
A(1)r . (11)
The set Λ1 is fairly simple and corresponds to the con-
vex combinations of the two points (1, 0) and (0, 1), which
could be thought of as comprising Λ0. Using Λ1 and the
above lemma we can prove two simple properties of the
sets Λn:
1. (0, 1) ∈ Λn and (1, 0) ∈ Λn for all n.
2. Λn ⊂ [0, 1]× [0, 1] for all n.
Both properties are clearly true for Λ1. By induction
(0, 1) ∈ Λn−1 and (1, 0) ∈ Λn−1 implies that (12,
√
0) and
(02,
√
1) are in Λn. Similarly, if (A,B) ∈ Λn−1 implies
A ∈ [0, 1] and B ∈ [0, 1], then (B2,√A) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]
and so are convex combinations of such points.
The first non-trivial set is Λ2 which is the convex
combination of the points on the curve (t2,
√
1− t) for
t ∈ [0, 1]. The curve is plotted in Fig. 2. The dotted line
marks the lower boundary of its convex hull which can
be achieved using convex combinations of two points (the
rest of the lower boundary of the convex hull is simply
the curve itself).
Rather than keeping track of the sets Λn, it will be
simpler to study exclusively their lower boundary, which
will be curves connecting the points (1, 0) and (0, 1). All
the optimal protocols will live on these curves, and all
points below the curves will be unattainable. To formal-
ize the notion of lower boundary we associate to every
function f(z) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] the following sets:
f+ = {(z, w) | z ∈ [0, 1], f(z) < w ≤ 1}, (12)
f= = {(z, w) | z ∈ [0, 1], f(z) = w}, (13)
f− = {(z, w) | z ∈ [0, 1], f(z) > w ≥ 0}. (14)
Returning to the case of Λ2 and Fig. 2, we see that
the lower boundary follows the original curve
√
1−√z
between (1, 0) and some point which we shall call (α2, β2).
It then turns into a straight line connecting the point
(α2, β2) to the point (0, 1). The point (α2, β2) can be
found by calculating the slope of the line connecting each
point to (0, 1) and choosing the point that achieves the
maximum.
In fact, all of the lower boundaries will have this form.
Define for n > 1
fn(z) =


√
1−
(
1−β2n√
αn
)√
z for z ∈ [0, αn],
βn
1−αn (1− z) for z ∈ [αn, 1],
(15)
where
αn =
n− 1
3(n+ 1)
, βn =
√
n+ 2
3n
. (16)
For the case n = 1 we define f1(z) = 1− z, which is the
limit of fn as n→ 1. Because αn ∈ (0, 1) and βn ∈ (0, 1)
for all n > 1, the functions satisfy fn(z) ∈ [0, 1] for all
z ∈ [0, 1]. These functions are also the lower boundaries
of convex regions:
Lemma 4. For all n ≥ 1, the function fn is strictly
decreasing, and the region f=n ∪ f+n is convex.
Proof. The case of n = 1 is trivial. For n > 1 we have
f ′n(z) =
{
− 1−β2n
4
√
αn
√
zfn(z)
for z ∈ [0, αn],
− βn1−αn for z ∈ [αn, 1],
(17)
which is well defined and negative on (0, 1]. For z near
zero, f(z) ≃ 1 − (1 − β2n)/(2
√
αn)
√
z, therefore f(z) is
also strictly decreasing at z = 0.
The derivative is also continuous on (0, 1] because at
z = αn we have
βn
1− αn =
√
3(n+ 1)
2
√
n(n+ 2)
=
1− β2n
4αnβn
. (18)
Furthermore, in the region (0, αn), the second derivative
is
f ′′n (z) = f
′
n(z)
[
− 1
2z
− f
′
n(z)
fn(z)
]
(19)
=
−f ′n(z)
4z
√
αnf2n(z)
[
2
√
αn − 3(1− β2n)
√
z
]
> 0
5where the inequality holds because 3(1−β2n) < 2. There-
fore f ′n(z) is monotonically increasing on (0, 1], and the
region above fn(z) in this interval is convex. The point
(0, 1) can be included because the closure of a convex set
is convex.
We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this
section.
Lemma 5. For all n ∈ Z+, Λn ⊂ f=n ∪f+n and f=n ⊂ Λn.
Proof. The statement is clearly true for n = 1 since
Λ1 = f
=
1 . We will prove the rest of the cases induc-
tively. Assume the theorem holds for Λn, which implies
that (z, fn(z)) ∈ Λn for all z. By Lemma 3 we have
that (f2n(z),
√
z) ∈ Λn+1 for all z ∈ [0, 1] and so are
convex combinations of pairs of such points. The curve
parametrized by (f2n(z),
√
z) can also be described by the
points (w, gn(w)) for
gn(w) =


√
1−
(
1−αn
βn
)√
w for w ∈ [0, β2n],
√
αn
1−β2n (1− w) for w ∈ [β
2
n, 1].
(20)
Note how under the map (x, y) → (y2,√x) the straight
line turns into a curve, and the curve turns into a straight
line. Furthermore, because of the exchange of x and y,
the straight line ends up on the right-hand side.
The pattern of points αn and βn, in addition to guaran-
teeing that the region above fn(z) is convex, also satisfies
the recursion relation
1− αn
βn
=
2
√
n(n+ 2)√
3(n+ 1)
=
1− β2n+1√
αn+1
(21)
and therefore gn(z) = fn+1(z) in the region [0, αn+1]
(since αn+1 ≤ 1/3 ≤ β2n). Pictorially, the curve g=n is like
the curve f=n+1, except that the straight line intersects
the curve somewhat to the right, and hence the region
above g=n is not convex. Its convex hull will give us the
region above the curve f=n+1.
Thus far we have shown g=n ⊂ Λn+1, as are convex
combinations of pairs of points on the curve g=n . Because
g=n = f
=
n+1 in the region [0, αn+1] we know that this seg-
ment of the curve is in Λn+1. The rest of the curve f
=
n+1 is
simply the convex combination of the points (αn+1, βn+1)
and (1, 0) both of which are in g=n . We have therefore
proven the second part of the lemma: f=n+1 ⊂ Λn+1.
We now intend to prove that gn(z) ≥ fn+1(z) for all
z ∈ [0, 1]. The statement is clearly true in the region
[0, αn+1] where both are equal. In the region [β
2
n, 1] it is
also true because both functions are straight lines ending
in (1, 0), and the starting point of the lines are gn(β
2
n) =√
αn and fn+1(β
2
n) = βn+1(1 − β2n)/(1 − αn+1). The
inequality fn+1(β
2
n) ≥ gn(β2n) can be proven by checking
that [fn+1(β
2
n)/gn(β
2
n)]
2 − 1 = −4/[n2(n + 3)] ≤ 0 for
n ≥ 1. Finally, in the region [αn+1, β2n] the functions
fn+1(z) and gn(z) start off at the same point, with the
same derivative, but f ′′n+1(z) = 0 in this region whereas
g′′n(z) initially is positive, and has only one zero in the
region, which can be checked as in Eq. (19). If the curve
gn were to cross the curve fn+1 at any point in this region,
then it would have to end below it. However, we already
argued that gn(β
2
n) ≥ fn+1(β2n) and therefore the curve
g=n must lie above the curve f
=
n+1 in the middle region as
well.
So far we have shown that (g=n ∪ g+n ) ⊂ (f=n+1 ∪ f+n+1).
By the induction assumption, Λn ⊂ f=n ∪ f+n . Under the
map (x, y) → (y2,√x), the region f=n ∪ f+n maps into
the region to the right of the curve g=n , which also equals
the region g=n ∪ g+n because gn(z) is strictly decreasing,
gn(1) = 0, and gn(0) = 1. Finally, using Lemma 3 we
know that Λn+1 is contained in the convex combination of
points in g=n ∪g+n . Because (g=n ∪g+n ) ⊂ (f=n+1∪f+n+1), and
f=n+1 ∪ f+n+1 is convex, we have Λn+1 ⊂ f=n+1 ∪ f+n+1.
Combining the previous lemma with the definition of
the sets Λn, we have proven the following theorem:
Theorem 6. Every (n+1)-message quantum weak coin-
flipping protocol based on an n-Coin-Game satisfies
PBP
∗
B ≥ f2n(PAP ∗A). (22)
Additionally, we have the following corollary for the limit
of n→∞:
Corollary 7. All quantum weak coin-flipping protocols
based on an n-Coin-Game (for any n ∈ Z+) satisfy
PAP
∗
A ≤
1
3
=⇒ PBP ∗B ≥ 1− 2
√
PAP ∗A
3
≥ 1
3
(23)
PBP
∗
B ≤
1
3
=⇒ PAP ∗A ≥ 1− 2
√
PBP ∗B
3
≥ 1
3
(24)
In particular,
max (PAP
∗
A, PBP
∗
B) ≥
1
3
, (25)
and
max(P ∗A, P
∗
B) ≥
2
3
for PA = PB =
1
2
. (26)
Proof. The above results use the limit:
f∞(z) =
{√
1− 2√
3
√
z for z ∈ [0, 13 ],√
3
2 (1− z) for z ∈ [ 13 , 1],
(27)
which has the symmetry b = f2∞(a)⇒ a = f2∞(b).
IV. OPTIMAL PROTOCOLS
In this section we will describe protocols that match
the lower bounds derived in the previous section. In a
sense, most of the work has already been done since the
proof of the previous section was constructive. What re-
mains undone is to explicitly construct the n-Coin-Games
6and to calculate from them PA, P
∗
A and P
∗
B (rather than
only their products).
From the discussion of the previous section we can see
that the interesting (n+1)-Coin-Games live on the curve
f=n+1. The points on the rounded part of the curve (the
left segment) involve no convex combinations of points
from n-Coin-Games and therefore are not new (i.e., they
are protocols that can be described by a single n-Coin-
Game with Alice’s and Bob’s role reversed). The inter-
esting points at level n + 1 lie on the straight segment
and are the combination of the points (αn+1, βn+1) and
(1, 0). To understand this segment we need to describe
the n-Coin-Games that produce points (β2n+1,
√
αn+1)
and (0, 1). The second point corresponds to a tree that
is fairly simple: it has the value 1 at every leaf and the
rest of the nodes are irrelevant. The n-Coin-Games for
(β2n+1,
√
αn+1) is what we shall describe next.
Lemma 8. For each n ∈ Z+ there is an n-Coin-Game,
G(n), such that
A(n)r = β2n+1 =
n+ 3
3(n+ 1)
, (28)
B(n)r =
√
αn+1 =
√
n
3(n+ 2)
, (29)
H(n)r =
{
n
2(n+1) n even,
n+1
2(n+2) n odd,
(30)
with A(n), B(n) and H(n) defined in terms of G(n) by
Eqs. (1,2). In particular, the associated quantum weak
coin-flipping protocols have:
PA(n) = 1−H(n)r =
{
n+2
2(n+1) n even,
n+3
2(n+2) n odd,
(31)
P ∗A(n) =
A(n)r
1−H(n)r
=
{
2(n+3)
3(n+2) n even,
2(n+2)
3(n+1) n odd,
(32)
P ∗B(n) =
(B(n)r )
2
H(n)r
=
{
2(n+1)
3(n+2) n even,
2n
3(n+1) n odd.
(33)
Proof. Define the parameters
γn =
n
n+ 2
, (34)
which are the weights needed for the convex combina-
tions. And let
G(1)r = γ1, G(1)0 = 1, G(1)1 = 0, (35)
which leads to A(1)r = 2/3 and B(1)r = H(1)r = 1/3. The
rest of the Coin-Games are defined inductively:
G(n)r = γn, (36)
G(n)0x =
{
1− G(n−1)x for |x| = n− 1,
G(n−1)x for |x| < n− 1,
(37)
G(n)1x =
{
0 for |x| = n− 1,
G(n−1)x for |x| < n− 1.
(38)
0
1
0
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FIG. 3: A truncated tree equivalent to G(4).
The values of G(n)1x for |x| < n−1 are actually irrelevant
but were chosen so that G(n)x = γn−|x| whenever |x| <
n−1, and therefore these protocols fit into the subfamily
studied in Ref. [1].
The reason for inverting the value of the leaves relates
to our insistence that Alice always send the first mes-
sage, which implies that the sender of the last message
alternates as n is increased and correspondingly the as-
signments of winning and losing for the coin outcome
need to be flipped.
In fact, the pattern of the leaves is fairly simple. It is
chosen so that it depends on the parity of the location
(from left to right) of the first 1 symbol in the string x. In
the quantum protocol this translates into the first sender
of a 1 qubit being the winner of the coin-flip (assuming
they pass the cheat detection phase).
In fact, the trees G(n) would best be described by trun-
cated trees of the form of Fig. 3. However, we shall con-
tinue using trees with all leaves at the same depth in
order to be consistent with the previous section.
Returning to the proof of the lemma, it is easy to see
that A(n)1x = 1 and B(n)1x = H(n)1x = 0 for all strings x. The
left side of the tree satisfiesA(n)0x = B(n−1)x , B(n)0x = A(n−1)x
and H(n)0x = 1 − H(n−1)x for all strings x. Therefore the
root nodes are
A(n)r = γn
(
B(n−1)r
)2
+(1− γn) 1, (39)
B(n)r = γn
√
A(n−1)r +(1− γn) 0, (40)
H(n)r = γn
(
1−H(n−1)r
)
+(1− γn) 0. (41)
It is then straightforward to plug in the expressions as
functions of n for all the above parameters and check that
Eqs. (28–30) are always satisfied.
Interestingly, the sequence of protocols is such that
PA and PB do not change when n increases from an odd
integer to an even one, whereas P ∗A and P
∗
B do not change
when n increases from an even integer to an odd one. We
7offer no intuition for this property. Note, however, that
for a given n, the associated protocol corresponds to a
single point on the surface of optimal protocols in the
3-dimensional space of triplets (PA, P
∗
A, P
∗
B) that can be
achieved with n+ 1 quantum messages.
For large n, the sequence of protocols converges to
PA = PB = 1/2 and P
∗
A = P
∗
B = 2/3, yielding a protocol
with bias of 1/6. It would also be desirable to show the
existence of a sequence of protocols that converges to the
same point but such that PA = PB = 1/2 for every pro-
tocol in the sequence. This can be easily accomplished
by choosing, for each n, the point along the curve f=n
that has Hr = 1/2. In the Coin-Game language we need
to modify the top coin Gr, and we therefore introduce a
new sequence of Coin-Games G′(n) defined as
G′x(n) =
{
1/
(
2− 2H(n−1)r
)
x = r,
G(n)x otherwise.
(42)
For simplicity, we will concentrate on the case when n is
even so that:
A′r(n) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
(
B(n−1)r
)2
+
1
n+ 2
, (43)
B′r(n) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
√
A(n−1)r , (44)
H′r(n) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
(1 −H(n−1)r ) =
1
2
(45)
and the associated probabilities of winning by cheating
are
P ∗A(n)
′ = 2A′r(n) =
2
3
, (46)
P ∗B(n)
′ = 2
(
B′r(n)
)2
=
2
3
(n+ 1)2
n(n+ 2)
. (47)
That is, we have identified a nice sequence of quantum
protocols with n + 1 messages (for n even) where PA =
PB = 1/2 and P
∗
A = 2/3 are all fixed and P
∗
B decreases
from 3/4 to 2/3. Of course, the case n = 2 belongs to the
family studied by Spekkens and Rudolph [2] and satisfies
P ∗AP
∗
B = 1/2.
As discussed in the introduction to the previous sec-
tion, the above protocols are optimal in the following
sense: to decrease one of P ∗A or P
∗
B while keeping the
number of messages fixed, we would have to increase
the other parameter. However, the protocols are not
optimal in the sense that they minimize the bias ǫ =
max(P ∗A, P
∗
B)−1/2 for a fixed number of messages. Only
in the limit of infinite messages is the bias of the above
protocols optimal.
Thus far, we have identified the point (1/3,
√
1/3) ∈
f=∞ as a protocol with PA = 1/2 and P
∗
A = P
∗
B = 2/3.
The other points on the curve f=∞ can be found using
the same trick of modifying the top coin Gr. That is, let
G′(n) be as above but with G′r(n) = t, where t ∈ [0, 1] is
a parameter we can choose freely. In the limit of n→∞
we find:
A′r(∞)(t) = t
1
3
+ (1− t), (48)
B′r(∞)(t) = t
√
1
3
, (49)
H′r(∞)(t) = t
1
2
. (50)
The associated quantum weak coin-flipping parameters
are
PA(t) = 1− t
2
, (51)
P ∗A(t) =
2
3
3− 2t
2− t , (52)
P ∗B(t) =
2
3
t. (53)
These protocols correspond to the right half of the curve
f=∞ (i.e., the points (z, f∞(z)) for z ∈ [1/3, 1]). The
other half of the curve can be obtained by symmetry be-
tween Alice and Bob. In the Coin-Game formalism this
symmetry arises by creating a new (n + 1)-Coin-Game,
G′, out of given n-Coin-Game, G, by the rules G′r = 1,
G′0x = G′1x = Gx for |x| < n and G′0x = G′1x = 1 − Gx for
|x| = n. In the language of protocols, we are forcing Al-
ice’s first message to have no content, which is equivalent
to allowing Bob to begin the game.
The results can be best summarized by eliminating the
variable t from Eqs. (51–53), which proves this section’s
main theorem:
Theorem 9. There exist quantum weak coin-flipping
protocols that asymptotically approach the curve
P ∗A + P
∗
B −
3
4
P ∗AP
∗
B = 1 (54)
in the limit of large number of messages. The correspond-
ing probabilities of winning when the game is played hon-
estly are
PA =
3
4
P ∗A when P
∗
A ≤ P ∗B , (55)
PB =
3
4
P ∗B when P
∗
A ≥ P ∗B. (56)
Implementing the optimal protocols
Surprisingly, the optimal protocols identified above are
significantly easier to describe and implement than a
generic protocol associated with a random n-Coin-Game.
Here we shall present a brief description of the simplified
protocol associated with the Coin-Games from Eqs. (42–
47).
We begin by fixing a security parameter n, which will
lead to an n+2 message quantum protocol. For simplicity
we assume that n is even.
8The first n messages of the quantum protocol each in-
volve one player preparing a two qubit entangled state
and sending one of the two qubits to the other player.
The two qubit states can be written as
√
ai|00〉+
√
1− ai|11〉 (57)
for i = 1, . . . , n, where
ai =
{
n+1
n+2 i = 1,
n−i+1
n−i+3 i 6= 1.
(58)
As usual Alice is in charge of sending the odd messages
(and hence preparing the odd numbered states) whereas
Bob sends the even numbered messages.
At the end of the above procedure Alice and Bob
should each have n qubits, which can be expressed in
a basis of n-bit strings with the most significant bit cor-
responding to the first qubit sent or received. They now
each perform a two-outcome measurement which can be
described as follows: let S be the set of all n-bit strings
such that the first occurrence of the digit one, when the
bits are examined from left to right, appears at an even
location, again counting from left to right (i.e., for n = 4
we have S = {0001, 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111}). The two
outcome measurement is given by the POVM elements
E0 = I − E1, E1 =
∑
x∈S
|x〉〈x|. (59)
As usual Alice wins on outcome zero and Bob wins on
outcome one. Note that, in essence, the first person to
send a qubit in the “one” state is the winner at this
stage. However, the following cheat detection step will be
powerful enough to dissuade against the obvious cheating
strategy.
Before outputting the final answer the party who won
sends all their qubits over to the losing party who then
does an extra cheat-detecting two-outcome measurement
to verify that the 2n qubit state now in their possession
is the correct one (i.e., they project onto the state and
its complement). Unfortunately, this final step is likely
to be very fairly difficult with current technology for any
n > 2.
In the end, the resulting protocol goes to a bias of 1/6
as n is taken to infinity. For n = 4 Bob’s probability of
winning by cheating is P ∗B = 0.694 whereas for n = 6 we
get P ∗B = 0.681. Furthermore, Alice’s cheating is always
restricted at P ∗A = 2/3. Protocols with more symmetry
between Alice and Bob can also be described as above by
changing the coefficients {ai}.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have identified a large family of quantum protocols
for weak coin flipping, that are based on classical public-
coin games. The family contains protocols approaching
the curve P ∗A + P
∗
B − 34P ∗AP ∗B = 1, which can be reached
asymptotically in the limit of large number of messages.
The most important of these protocols is symmetric be-
tween Alice and Bob and achieves PA = PB = 1/2 and
P ∗A = P
∗
B = 2/3, that is, it has a bias of 1/6.
Furthermore, we have proven lower bounds for the
bias achievable by protocols in this family. In particu-
lar, max(P ∗A, P
∗
B) ≥ 2/3 or equivalently ǫ ≥ 1/6. These
lower bounds show that the protocols found above are
optimal within their family.
Our lower bounds also establish a strict hierarchy
among coin-flipping protocols in our family with differ-
ent number of messages. Admittedly, the hierarchy is
of little practical interest since a small number of mes-
sages suffices in all cases to construct protocols that are
reasonably close to optimal.
Though the question of optimal bias for a general quan-
tum weak coin-flipping protocol remains open, we specu-
late that it might be possible to show that every protocol
is equivalent to one contained in the family analyzed in
this paper. Future work will be needed to verify this
conjecture.
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APPENDIX A: THE PROTOCOL
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the (n+1)-
message quantum weak coin-flipping protocol associated
to each n-Coin-Game. For each protocol we shall also
derive matching upper and lower bounds on the amount
that each party can cheat and thereby prove Theorem 1.
All the general ideas needed in this section have ap-
peared previously in Ref. [1], though in a somewhat dif-
ferent notation. The new elements of this appendix are:
1. Ref. [1] was restricted to n-Coin-Games where all
the binary nodes at the same depth had the same
value (i.e, Gx = Gx′ if |x| = |x′| < n). These vari-
ables were given the name ai so that Gx = a|x|+1.
In this section we lift the restriction and consider
general n-Coin-Games.
2. An upper bound on P ∗A and P
∗
B was derived in
Ref. [1] but was not proven optimal. In this sec-
tion we shall derive a matching lower bound.
Because most of the ideas here have been published
elsewhere, we shall simply prove the necessary facts in
this section without providing the intuition or motiva-
tion behind the constructions. For a more pedagogical
approach we refer the reader to Ref. [1].
9We begin by fixing an n-Coin-Game G, which will be
used throughout this section. We also fix H, A and B
as given by Eqs. (1,2). Because optimal protocols with
Hr = 0 and Hr = 1 are easy to construct even classically,
for what follows we shall assume that 0 < Hr < 1.
To describe the quantum protocol associated with G we
employ the standard quantum communication model in-
volving the Hilbert space decomposition HA⊗HM⊗HB,
where HA is Alice’s private space, HB is Bob’s private
space, and HM is the space used for passing messages.
We further subdivide these spaces as follows:
HA = Ha ⊗Ha′ ⊗Hac, (A1)
HB = Hb ⊗Hb′ ⊗Hbc, (A2)
HM = Hm ⊗Hmn. (A3)
The spaces Ha and Hb each consists of n qubits and will
be used to store a binary string x corresponding to a
node in G. The individual qubits comprising each space
will be referred to as a1 through an and b1 though bn
respectively. The one-qubit spaceHm will be the primary
means of communication between Alice and Bob, and will
be referred to as qubit m.
The rest of the spaces will only be used in the last pair
of messages. The spaces Ha′ , Hb′ and Hmn each involve
n qubits whereas Hac and Hbc each contain one qubit.
Before describing the protocol we need to define a set
of unitaries on HA ⊗HM . We begin with the controlled
rotations RA,k defined for k = 1, . . . , n by
RA,k =
∑
x
|x|=k−1
|x〉〈x|a1,...,ak−1 ⊗ U(Gx)ak,m, (A4)
where
U(z) =


√
z 0 0 −√1− z
0
√
z −√1− z 0
0
√
1− z √z 0√
1− z 0 0 √z

 . (A5)
The subscripts on the operators and matrices indicate
what qubits they act on, and RA,k acts trivially on all
qubits of HA ⊗ HM not explicitly mentioned. For the
case k = 1 the operator is not a controlled rotation but
rather a regular rotation using parameter Gr .
We shall also need the controlled rotation
RA,E =
∑
x
|x|=n
|x〉〈x|a1,...,an ⊗
(
1− Gx −Gx
Gx 1− Gx
)
ac
,
(A6)
which is unitary because Gx ∈ {0, 1} for |x| = n. The gate
is simply a controlled-X applied to the qubit in spaceHac,
where the control depends on a function of the qubits in
Ha. Note that RA,E can also be defined as an operator
acting purely on HA rather than HA ⊗HM .
Finally, define SA,k for k = 1, . . . , n to swap qubit ak
with qubit m:
SA,k = SWAP(ak,m). (A7)
We also need TA,0 which swapsHa with Hmn conditioned
on qubit ac being zero, and TA,1 which swaps the space
Ha′ with the space Hnm conditioned on qubit ac being
one:
TA,0 = |0〉〈0|ac ⊗ SWAP(Ha, Hmn) + |1〉〈1|ac ⊗ I, (A8)
TA,1 = |1〉〈1|ac ⊗ SWAP(Hmn, Ha′) + |0〉〈0|ac ⊗ I.(A9)
The first one is used to send the qubits in Ha when Alice
wins, whereas the second one is used to receive Bob’s
qubits and put them in Ha′ when Alice loses.
All the above operators act on Alice’s Hilbert space.
We can similarly define the operators RB,k, RB,E , SB,k
acting in the same way on Bob’s qubits. The operator
TB,0 however has to be defined to swap Hb′ with Hmn
conditioned on qubit bc being zero, whereas TB,1 swaps
Hb with Hmn conditioned on qubit bc being one.
To characterize the final measurements it is useful to
define the probability tree P by
Px =


1 if x = r,
GyPy if x = y0,
(1− Gy)Py if x = y1.
(A10)
That is, Px is the probability of reaching node x when the
classical coin-flipping game associated with G is played
honestly. We can now define the two normalized states
|ψA,1〉 = 1√Hr
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx=1
√
Px|x〉Ha ⊗ |x〉Ha′ ⊗ |1〉Hac ,
|ψB,0〉 = 1√
1−Hr
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx=0
√
Px|x〉Hb ⊗ |x〉Hb′ ⊗ |0〉Hbc .
(A11)
The normalization is correct because Hr is the proba-
bility of arriving at a leaf x such that Gx = 1, whereas
1−Hr is the probability of arriving at a leaf with Gx = 0.
We are now ready to describe the main protocol.
Protocol 1. Given an n-Coin-Game, G, and the asso-
ciated operators described above, define a quantum weak
coin-flipping protocol by the following steps:
1. Setup: Alice starts with HA ⊗ HM and Bob with
HB. They each initialize their space to the state
|0〉.
2. First n messages. For k = 1 to n:
• If k is odd, Alice applies RA,k and sends HM
to Bob who applies SB,k.
• If k is even, Bob applies RB,k and sends HM
to Alice who applies SA,k.
3. Alice applies RA,E to HA and Bob applies RB,E to
HB. No messages are needed for this step.
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4. If Bob has HM he sends it to Alice.
5. Alice applies TA,0 and sends HM to Bob who ap-
plies TB,0.
6. Bob applies TB,1 and sends HM to Alice who ap-
plies TA,1.
7. Alice measures using the two outcome POVM {I −
|ψA,1〉〈ψA,1|, |ψA,1〉〈ψA,1|}. Bob measures the two
outcome POVM {|ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|, I − |ψB,0〉〈ψB,0|}.
They each output zero for the first outcome and one
for the second.
The basic intuition behind the protocol is that the
first three steps above is a quantum implementation of
the classical public-coin coin-flipping protocol associated
with G described in Sec. II. After k messages the first k
bits of HA contain a length k string indicating the depth
k node at which we are currently located. The quantum
amplitude associated with each such state is
√Px. Step
3 is a unitary realization of the measurement that looks
at the n bit string x corresponding to a leaf, and stores
the classical coin outcome in the qubit associated with
Hac for Alice and Hbc for Bob.
The rest of the steps involve cheat detection. Effec-
tively, the winner declares victory immediately and then
sends as much of their state as possible to the other party.
The losing party then checks that the state is correct be-
fore accepting defeat.
Note that, as written, the above protocol takes either
n+ 2 or n+ 3 messages. However, it is easy to see that
the protocol can be run with only n + 1 messages. For
starters, only the space Hm needs to be sent back and
forth in step 2, whereas only Hmn is used in steps 5 and
6. If we allow such a splitting, Alice starts with Hmn
and step 4 is never needed. This reduces the protocol to
n + 2 messages always. But if n is odd then Alice ends
up sending two messages in a row. The two messages can
be combined into a single longer message and therefore
the protocol only requires n + 1 messages. We will also
argue below that steps 5 and 6 can be interchanged, in
which case when n is even Bob sends two messages in a
row, and their merger leads again to a protocol with only
n+ 1 messages.
We turn to the task of describing the evolution of the
game when both players are honest. The action of RA,k
entangles qubit ak with qubit m, whereas SB,k swaps
qubit m with bk. Their combined effect is the transfor-
mation √
Px|x〉a1,...,ak−1 ⊗ |0〉ak ⊗ |0〉bk (A12)
−→
√
Px0|x〉a1,...,ak−1 ⊗ |0〉ak ⊗ |0〉bk
+
√
Px1|x〉a1,...,ak−1 ⊗ |1〉ak ⊗ |1〉bk .
The same effect occurs on even rounds when Alice’s and
Bob’s actions are reversed. Therefore, the state after the
first k passes through step 2 is given by
|ψk〉 =
∑
x
|x|=k
√Px |x0 · · · 0〉Ha ⊗ |0〉Ha′⊗Hac (A13)
⊗|x0 · · · 0〉Hb ⊗ |0〉Hb′⊗Hbc ⊗ |0〉HM ,
where there are n− k zeroes following each x.
Step 3 simply has the effect of setting up the fair coin
outcome in Hac and Hbc:
|ψE〉 =
∑
x
|x|=n
√Px |x〉Ha ⊗ |0〉Ha′ ⊗ |Gx〉Hac (A14)
⊗|x〉Hb ⊗ |0〉Hb′ ⊗ |Gx〉Hbc ⊗ |0〉HM .
Finally, when both players are honest, step 5 has the
effect of moving Ha to Hb′ conditioned on qubits ac and
bc both being one. Step 6 has the effect of swapping Hb
to Ha′ conditioned on ac and bc being both zero. The
final state of the protocol is therefore:
|ψF 〉=
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx=1
√
Px|x〉Ha ⊗ |x〉Ha′ ⊗ |1〉Hac (A15)
⊗|0〉Hb ⊗ |0〉Hb′ ⊗ |1〉Hbc ⊗ |0〉HM
+
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx=0
√
Px|0〉Ha ⊗ |0〉Ha′ ⊗ |0〉Hac
⊗|x〉Hb ⊗ |x〉Hb′ ⊗ |0〉Hbc ⊗ |0〉HM
=
√
Hr|ψA,1〉 ⊗ |0〉Hb⊗Hb′ ⊗ |1〉Hbc ⊗ |0〉HM
+
√
1−Hr|0〉Ha⊗Ha′ ⊗ |0〉Hac ⊗ |ψB,0〉 ⊗ |0〉HM .
Because |ψA,1〉 is orthogonal to any state with the value
zero in register Hac and |ψB,1〉 is orthogonal to any state
with the value one in register Hbc, there are only two
possible outcomes for the final measurements:
• Alice obtains I − |ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| and Bob obtains
|ψB,0〉〈ψB,0| in which case they both output zero,
that is, Alice wins. This happens with probability
1−Hr.
• Alice obtains |ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| and Bob obtains I −
|ψB,0〉〈ψB,0| in which case they both output one,
that is, Bob wins. This happens with probability
Hr.
We have therefore proven the following lemma:
Lemma 10. When playing Protocol 1 honestly, Alice’s
and Bob’s outputs are perfectly correlated and satisfy
PA = 1−Hr, PB = Hr. (A16)
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1. Reformulation as an SDP
We now turn to the analysis of the advantage that a
cheating player can attain. Specifically, we shall focus
on the case of honest Alice and cheating Bob. The case
where Alice is cheating is fairly similar and will be derived
at the end of the appendix from the case of cheating Bob.
When Bob is cheating we don’t know exactly what
operations (unitaries, measurements, or superoperators)
he may be applying to his qubits. In fact, we don’t even
know howmany qubits he may have in his laboratory. We
shall therefore focus only on the evolution of the qubits
under Alice’s control. This approach, first advocated by
Kitaev [11], will transform the maximization over Bob’s
cheating strategies into a semidefinite program (SDP).
Let ρ0 be the initial state of all qubits under Alice’s
control, that is, it is a density operator on HA ⊗ HM .
Let ρ1, . . . , ρn be the state of the qubits under Alice’s
control after each of the n passes through step 2. Note
that ρk is a density operator for HA when k is odd, and
for HA⊗HM when k is even. Finally let ρE be the state
of HA⊗HM at the end of step 4 and let ρF be the state
of HA ⊗HM at the end of step 6.
Because Alice initializes her own qubits as prescribed
by the protocol without interference from Bob, their ini-
tial state is given by
ρ0 = |0〉〈0|HA⊗HM . (A17)
For odd k, Alice first applies the unitary RA,k and then
sends HM to Bob, leaving the state
ρk = TrM
[
RA,k ρk−1R−1A,k
]
(for k odd). (A18)
For even k, we can’t fully characterize ρk in terms of ρk−1
but we know that given ρk, if we undo the swap SA,k and
then send back HM we must end up with ρk−1, therefore
TrM
[
S−1A,k ρkSA,k
]
= ρk−1 (for k even). (A19)
Step 3 only involved the use of RA,E , a unitary on HA.
Step 4, the recovery ofHM , is only needed when n is odd.
Therefore,
ρE = RA,E ρnR
−1
A,E for n even, (A20)
TrM ρE = RA,E ρnR
−1
A,E for n odd. (A21)
Finally, the state of the qubits on HA after applying
TA,0 to ρE must equal the state ρF if we undo TA,1 (be-
cause as usual, Bob has no effect on Alice’s qubits):
TrM
[
T−1A,1 ρFTA,1
]
= TrM
[
TA,0 ρET
−1
A,0
]
. (A22)
The probability that Bob wins is given by the final
measurement
Tr [|ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| ρF ] , (A23)
where it is understood that |ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| can be extended
to an operator onHA⊗HM by tensoring with the identity
IM .
The preceding arguments show that no matter what
cheating strategy Bob employs, the sequence of states
for Alice’s qubits must satisfy the above equations, and
therefore P ∗B is upper bounded by the maximum of
Eq. (A23) over all assignments to the variables ρ0, . . . , ρn,
ρE , ρF consistent with the above equations. It is also not
hard to see that Bob can achieve any set of density ma-
trices consistent with the above equations by maintain-
ing the purification of Alice’s state. As this reduction
from maximization over cheating strategies to SDP has
already appeared in the literature [1, 11, 12] we won’t
belabor the point and simply state the lemma we have
proven:
Lemma 11. The maximum probability with which Bob
can win by cheating in Protocol 1 is given by the solution
of the SDP:
P ∗B = maxTr [|ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| ρF ] , (A24)
over the positive semidefinite variables ρ0, . . . , ρn, ρE, ρF
subject to the constraints of Eqs. (A17–A22).
The security of the above result depends solely on the
laws of quantum mechanics and the assumption that Bob
cannot directly influence the qubits in Alice’s laboratory.
We note that we are assuming, as is usual in coin-flipping
protocols, that Alice can measure the size of the Hilbert
space HM (i.e., the number of qubits sent by Bob in each
message) and that if at any point she receives more or
less than the required number of qubits she aborts the
protocol and declares herself the winner. The optimal
strategy for Bob involves sending the right number of
qubits in each message and therefore is described by the
above formalism.
It will be important below to know that we can ex-
change steps 5 and 6. This would work as follows: given
ρE we send HM to Bob, who is supposed to apply TB,1
to his qubits. Upon return, Alice applies TA,1 followed
by TA,0 ending up with state ρ
′
F satisfying
TrM
[
T−1A,1T
−1
A,0 ρ
′
FTA,0TA,1
]
= TrM [ρE ] . (A25)
The final measurement can be done immediately before
sending HM to Bob because it only has support on HA.
The probability of Bob winning is
Tr [|ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| ρ′F ] . (A26)
However, |ψA,1〉 only has support on the space where
qubit ac is one, and in this subspace TA,0 acts trivially
(and TA,0 and TA,1 commute). Applying projectors to
both sides of the Eq. (A22) and Eq. (A25) we see that
both SDPs are equivalent, and therefore steps 5 and 6 are
interchangeable, at least from the perspective of honest
Alice.
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2. Lower Bounds
To find a lower bound on P ∗B we shall describe a spe-
cific assignment of the variables ρ that satisfies the above
equations, and from it calculate Tr [|ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| ρF ]. Be-
cause P ∗B is a maximum over such assignments, this will
serve as a lower bound.
Let
ρk =
{
σk ⊗ |0〉〈0|ak+1,...,an ⊗ |0〉〈0|Ha′⊗Hac k odd
σk ⊗ |0〉〈0|ak+1,...,an ⊗ |0〉〈0|Ha′⊗Hac⊗HM k even
(A27)
where σk is a density operator for qubits a1 through ak.
The operators ρ1 through ρn satisfy Eqs. (A18,A19) pro-
vided that
σk = Trm
[
RA,k
(
σk−1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|ak,m
)
R−1A,k
]
(for k odd)
(A28)
where σ0 = 1 is the unit, and
Trak [σk] = σk−1 (for k even). (A29)
The σ operators above will be defined using a tree vari-
able W given by the equation
Wx =


1 x = r
GyWy x = y0 and |x| odd
(1− Gy)Wy x = y1 and |x| odd
GyB2xWy/By x = y0 and |x| even
(1− Gy)B2xWy/By x = y1 and |x| even
(A30)
which is based on the weight matrix W of Ref. [1]. Note
that, though it is possible for By to be zero, this can only
occur if both By0 and By1 are zero as well, in this case
we define Wy0 = Wy1 = 0, which resolves the potential
division by zero.
Because B is computed bottom-up, whereasW is com-
puted top-down, every node of W depends on the com-
plete n-Coin-Game assignment G. The appearance at
every node of such global information about the protocol
is crucial for optimal solutions of these SDPs and will
also occur with the tree variable Z defined below in the
section on upper bounds.
Define the σ operators as diagonal matrices with en-
tries given by
〈x|σk|x〉 =Wx for |x| = k. (A31)
The requirements of Eq. (A28) are satisfied if
Wy0 = GyWy and Wy1 = (1− Gy)Wy (for |y| even),
(A32)
whereas Eq. (A29) only imposes the weaker requirement
Wy =Wy0 +Wy1 (for |y| odd), (A33)
both of which are clearly satisfied by W . We have there-
fore outlined a valid cheating strategy for Bob through
step 2.
The next two steps will follow the protocol exactly, in
which case the operator ρE follows from ρn by adjusting
the space Hac:
ρE =
∑
x
Wx|x〉〈x|Ha ⊗ |0〉〈0|Ha′ ⊗ |Gx〉〈Gx|Hac
⊗|0〉〈0|HM . (A34)
Finally, in the last steps, conditioned on qubit ac be-
ing zero Alice sends her state to Bob. Conditioned on
qubit ac being one, Bob returns the purification of the
remaining qubits, so the final state is:
ρF = |φ1〉〈φ1|Ha⊗Ha′ ⊗ |1〉〈1|Hac ⊗ |0〉〈0|HM (A35)
+C0|0〉〈0|Ha⊗Ha′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|Hac ⊗ |0〉〈0|HM ,
where C0 is an unimportant constant (equal to the sum
of Wx for all x such that Gx = 0), and |φ1〉 is the unnor-
malized state given by
|φ1〉 =
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx=1
√
Wx|x〉Ha ⊗ |x〉Ha′ . (A36)
Bob’s probability of winning is given by
p =
∣∣∣(〈φ1|Ha⊗Ha′ ⊗ 〈1|Hac
)
|ψA,1〉
∣∣∣2 (A37)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx
√
WxPx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
/Hr,
where the factor of Gx ensures that the sum is only taken
over strings x satisfying Gx = 1.
While the expression for computing p seems rather
daunting, we shall show in a moment that when prop-
erly written, it is a conserved quantity that has the same
value at every depth in the tree. We begin with the fol-
lowing two observations: for |y| even√By0√Wy0Py0 +√By1√Wy1Py1
=
(
Gy
√
By0 + (1 − Gy)
√
By1
)√
WyPy
= By
√
WyPy (A38)
whereas for |y| odd we have
By0
√
Wy0Py0 + By1
√
Wy1Py1
=
(GyB2y0 + (1 − Gy)B2y1)√WyPy/By
=
√By√WyPy. (A39)
For the special case when By = 0 the equation is also
valid as it reads 0 + 0 = 0. By induction, we can obtain
the following result
Br
√
WrPr =
{∑
x;|x|=k Bx
√WxPx for any even k,∑
x;|x|=k
√Bx
√WxPx for any odd k,
(A40)
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where as usual 0 ≤ k ≤ n. In particular, because for
|x| = n we have Gx = Bx =
√Bx ∈ {0, 1} we have shown
that p =
∣∣Br√WrPr∣∣2 /Hr, which is the probability with
which Bob can win the coin-flip by cheating using the
strategy outlined above. Since Wr = Pr = 1 we have
proven the desired lower bound:
Lemma 12. For Protocol 1:
P ∗B ≥
B2r
Hr . (A41)
3. Upper Bounds
We shall prove an upper bound by exhibiting a solu-
tion to the dual SDP. We use the derivation of the dual
in Ref. [12], though a direct derivation (as was done in
Ref. [1]) would be fairly simple as well.
Our protocol can be rewritten in the notation of
Ref. [12]. Let m = ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ and define UA,1 = RA,1,
UA,j = RA,2j−1SA,2j−2 for j = 2, . . . ,m, UA,m+1 =
TA,0RA,ESA,n (or if n is odd just UA,m+1 = TA,0RA,E)
and UA,m+2 = TA,1. The final measurement is ΠA,1 =
|ψA,1〉〈ψA,1|. In this notation, we are looking for the max-
imum of Tr[ΠA,1 ρA,m+2] over assignments of the positive
semidefinite variables ρA,0, . . . , ρA,m+2 satisfying:
TrM [ρA,j] = TrM
[
UA,j ρA,j−1 U−1A,j
]
(A42)
for j = 1, . . . ,m + 2 and TrM [ρA,0] = |0〉〈0|HA . The
initial condition for ρA,0 (rather than the usual ρA,0 =
|0〉〈0|HA⊗HM ) simply gives Bob a little more cheating
power (i.e., to initialize HM ) but this is acceptable as we
are now focusing on deriving upper bounds on P ∗B and
this extra cheating power will not be helpful.
The dual SDP is given by Lemma 11 of Ref. [12] as the
minimization of 〈0|YA,0|0〉, subject to
YA,j ⊗ IHM ≥ U−1A,j+1 (YA,j+1 ⊗ IHM )UA,j+1 (A43)
for 0 ≤ j ≤ m + 1, where Y0, . . . , Ym+1 are Hermitian
operators on HA and YA,m+2 ≡ ΠA,1. Because this is the
dual SDP to the original coin-flipping SDP corresponding
to Protocol 1, any assignment of the variables YA,i that
satisfies the constraints will produce a value of 〈0|YA,0|0〉
that is an upper bound on P ∗B. However, rather than
finding a solution to the above dual SDP, we shall study
a modified, but equivalent, SDP:
Lemma 13. Let Z0, . . . , Zn+2 be a set of Hermitian ma-
trices, defined on HA, satisfying the following equations:
Zk ⊗ IHM ≥ R−1A,k+1 (Zk+1 ⊗ IHM )RA,k+1 (k even),
Zk ⊗ IHM ≥ S−1A,k+1 (Zk+1 ⊗ IHM )SA,k+1 (k odd),
(A44)
where 0 ≤ k < n, and
Zn ⊗ IHM ≥ R−1A,E (Zn+1 ⊗ IHM )RA,E , (A45)
Zn+1 ⊗ IHM ≥ T−1A,0 (Zn+2 ⊗ IHM )TA,0, (A46)
Zn+2 ⊗ IHM ≥ T−1A,1 (|ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| ⊗ IHM ) TA,1. (A47)
then β ≡ 〈0|Z0|0〉 is an upper bound on P ∗B .
The proof follows by noting that given a set of
Z0, . . . , Zn+2 satisfying the above equations, we can set
Y0 = Z0, Yj = Z2j−1 for j = 1, . . . ,m and Ym+1 = Zn+2
to obtain a solution with the same minimum as the orig-
inal dual SDP.
We introduce a new variable, defined on a tree of depth
n, which shall be used in constructing solutions of the
dual SDP:
Zx =


B2r/Hr x = r√BxZy/By |x| odd
Zy |x| even
(A48)
where y is the parent node of x (i.e., either x = y0 or
x = y1). Once again we resolve the division by zero by
declaring Zy0 = Zy1 = 0 whenever By = 0 and |y| is
even.
We begin the description of the solution to the dual
SDP by choosing
Zn+2 =
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx=1
Zx|x〉〈x|Ha ⊗ IHa′ ⊗ |1〉〈1|Hac . (A49)
To verify that Zn+2 satisfies Eq. (A47), we note that
we can move the unitary operators TA,1 to the left hand
side of the equation, where they act trivially (i.e., they
exchange IHa′ with IHmn). We are left with the task of
proving Zn+2 ≥ |ψA,1〉〈ψA,1|.
It is sufficient to show that
Zn+2 + ǫIHA ≥ |ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| (A50)
for every ǫ > 0. Because Zn+2 is non-negative, the left-
hand-side above is positive definite. We can rescale our
space by (Zn+2+ǫIHA)
−1/2 to obtain the equivalent equa-
tion
I ≥ (Zn+2 + ǫIHA)−
1
2 |ψA,1〉〈ψA,1| (Zn+2 + ǫIHA)−
1
2 .
(A51)
The right-hand-side of the above equation has only one
non-zero eigenvalue, it is therefore sufficient to check that
1 ≥ 〈ψA,1| (Zn+2 + ǫIHA)−1 |ψA,1〉. (A52)
We need to study the quantity
〈ψA,1| (Zn+2 + ǫIHA)−1 |ψA,1〉 =
∑
x
|x|=n
Gx=1
Px
Hr(Zx + ǫ)
(A53)
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which once again is related to a conserved quantity at
every level of the tree. However, we first note the fol-
lowing properties which can be checked directly from the
definitions:
• Px > 0 implies Py > 0 for every node y that has x
as a descendant.
• Px > 0 and Bx > 0 implies that By > 0 for every
node y that has x as a descendant.
• Px > 0 and Bx > 0 implies Zx > 0.
We can now remove ǫ from the above expression, be-
cause if Zx = 0 then either Px = 0 or Bx = 0 (which
implies Gx = 0):
〈ψA,1| (Zn+2 + ǫIHA)−1 |ψA,1〉 ≤
∑
x
|x|=n
Zx>1
GxPx
HrZx (A54)
where the factor Gx imposes the condition Gx = 1, and
the condition Zx > 0 has been moved into the sum.
If |y| is odd and Zy > 0 we have
B2y0Py0
Zy0 +
B2y1Py1
Zy1 =
(B2y0Gy + B2y1(1− Gy)) PyZy
=
ByPy
Zy , (A55)
where the left-hand side is well defined because Zy0 =
Zy1 = Zy > 0. If |y| is even we have
By0Py0
Zy0 +
By1Py1
Zy1 =
(√
By0Gy +
√
By1(1− Gy)
) ByPy
Zy
=
B2yPy
Zy . (A56)
Even if Zy > 0 it is possible for either Zy0 or Zy1 (or
both) to be zero. If both are zero, then so is ByPy. If
only one of them is zero (say Zy0) then the equation
is still valid with the offending term removed (that is,
By1Py1/Zy1 = B2yPy/Zy). Using induction, we can prove
1 =
B2rPr
HrZr =
{∑
x;|x|=k;Zx>0
B2xPx
HrZx for any even k∑
x;|x|=k;Zx>0
BxPx
HrZx for any odd k
(A57)
and in particular, because Gx = Bx = B2x for |x| = n we
have shown 〈ψA,1| (Zn+2 + ǫIHA)−1 |ψA,1〉 ≤ 1 for every
ǫ > 0, thus completing the proof that our choice for Zn+2
satisfies the requirement imposed by Eq. (A47).
The next few requirements are easier to check. Since
Zn+2 only has support on the space in which qubit ac is
one, on which TA,0 acts trivially, we can satisfy Eq. (A46)
by choosing
Zn+1 =
∑
x
|x|=n
Zx|x〉〈x|Ha ⊗ IHa′ ⊗ |Gx〉〈Gx|Hac
≥ Zn+2, (A58)
where the inequality follows because we have simply in-
cluded the (non-negative) coefficients for the states with
Gx = 0.
The unitary RA,E operates only on the spaceHA hence
Eq. (A45) can be satisfied by choosing
Zn = R
−1
A,EZn+1RA,E (A59)
=
∑
x
|x|=n
Zx|x〉〈x|Ha ⊗ IHa′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|Hac .
Finally, fix a new parameter ǫ′ > 0, and define
Zk =
∑
x
|x|=k
(
Zx + (n− k)ǫ
′
n
)
|x〉〈x|a1,...,ak (A60)
⊗|0〉〈0|Hak+1,...,an⊗Ha′⊗Hac
+Ck Ia1,...,ak ⊗ (I − |0〉〈0|)Hak+1,...,an⊗Ha′⊗Hac ,
for k = 0, . . . , n − 1. The constants Ck will be defined
recursively below, starting with Cn−1. For k = 0 the
above should be interpreted as
Z0 = (Zr + ǫ′) |0〉〈0|HA + C0 (I − |0〉〈0|)HA . (A61)
In order to prove that our solution to the dual SDP
is valid, all that remains is to check Eq. (A44). The
case of k odd is fairly simple because Zy = Zy0 = Zy1
for |y| odd, therefore qubit ak+1 of Zk+1 is unentangled
with the rest of the qubits and its state is the identity
density matrix (i.e., Zk+1 = Iak+1 ⊗ Z ′ where Z ′ is an
operator on the rest of the qubits). As the swap operator
SA,k+1 acts trivially on Zk+1 ⊗ IHM , it is sufficient to
check Zk ≥ Zk+1, which is satisfied if Ck ≥ Ck+1. For
the special case of k = n − 1 (and n even) it suffices to
choose Ck ≥ maxZx where the maximum is taken over
all strings x such that |x| = n.
What remains to be proven is Eq. (A44) for the case
of even k. Fix some even value of k and let α = Zk ⊗
IHM and β = R
−1
A,k+1 (Zk+1 ⊗ IHM )RA,k+1. There are
just the left- and right-hand sides of the equation we are
trying to prove: α ≥ β. Define the projector
Π = Ia1,...,ak ⊗ |0〉〈0|Hak+1,...,an⊗H′a⊗Hac ⊗ IHM . (A62)
We shall prove in a moment Π(α − β)Π = ǫ′nΠ. It is
also easy to see that Πα(I − Π) = (I − Π)αΠ = 0 and
(I−Π)α(I−Π) = Ck(I−Π). Under these conditions, it is
always possible to choose a large enough Ck so that α ≥
β, which defines Ck in terms of Ck+1 (except for Cn−1
which can be defined directly from Zn). For a proof, see
for instance the proof of Lemma 3 in Ref. [1].
To prove Π(α−β)Π = ǫ′nΠ we need to study the effect
of the unitary RA,k+1 on Zn+1. The expression has the
form of a sum of |x〉〈x|a1,...,ak tensored with
U(Gx)−1
[(
Zx0|0〉〈0|ak+1 + Zx1|1〉〈1|ak+1
)
⊗ Im
]
U(Gx)
(A63)
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for |x| = k, where U(z) is defined by Eq. (A5). The
component of the above that survives the projection Π
has the form
(GxZx0 + (1− Gx)Zx1) |0〉〈0|ak+1 ⊗ Im
=
(
Gx
√
Bx0 + (1− Gx)
√
Bx1
) Zx
Bx |0〉〈0|ak+1 ⊗ Im
= Zx|0〉〈0|ak+1 ⊗ Im. (A64)
It is now straightforward to check that ΠαΠ = ΠβΠ +
ǫ′
nΠ, completing the proof that our choice of Zk satisfies
Eq. (A44).
Note that, while the original protocol only depends on
the first column of the matrix U(z), the above calcula-
tion involved the entire matrix. The reason for this is
that when transforming from the SDP involving the Y
variables to the SDP involving the Z variables we gave
Bob a small amount of extra cheating power to set the
qubits in HM between application of SA,k and RA,k+1,
in which case the full matrix U(z) becomes important.
However, since the upper bound derived in this section
matches the lower bound from the last section, it should
be clear that such extra power is not useful.
The result thus far is the description of a set of vari-
ables Z0, . . . , Zn+2 satisfying the equations of the dual
SDP. This gives us an upper bound P ∗B ≤ β = 〈0|Z0|0〉 =
Zr+ǫ
′. However, since ǫ′ > 0 is arbitrary, we have proven
Lemma 14. For Protocol 1:
P ∗B ≤
B2r
Hr . (A65)
4. Honest Bob v Cheating Alice
The analysis of the case of honest Bob and cheating
Alice is fairly similar to the above calculations. Fortu-
nately, we can exploit certain symmetries in the protocol
to derive expressions for P ∗A from the above expressions
for P ∗B .
Given an n-Coin-Game G define a new (n + 1)-Coin-
Game, G′ by the rules G′r = 1, G′0x = G′1x = Gx for
|x| < n and G′0x = G′1x = 1 − Gx for |x| = n. We’d like
to argue that the quantum protocol associated with G′
is equivalent to the protocol associated with G but with
Alice’s and Bob’s roles exchanged.
The basic idea is that the first message of G′, which
Alice sends to Bob is the pure state |0〉. If Bob is cheat-
ing this state reveals no extra information about Alice’s
state, and if Alice is cheating she has no incentive to re-
veal herself as a cheater by sending anything other than
the state |0〉. The subsequent messages in G′ correspond
to those of G but with Alice and Bob reversed. The only
potential problem with this argument is that the order
of the cheat detection messages (steps 5 and 6) needs to
be switched in order to make the protocols equivalent.
However, we argued after formulating the problem as an
SDP that these two steps could be exchanged without
increasing or decreasing P ∗B.
Therefore, Bob’s maximum probability of winning by
cheating in G′, which we call P ∗B ′ and can be calculated
using the above formulas, equals P ∗A. But B′r =
√Ar and
H′r = 1 −Hr, where the primed variables are calculated
from G′. The conclusion is that
P ∗A = P
∗
B
′ =
B′2r
H′r
=
Ar
1−Hr . (A66)
In particular we have proven the main result of this
appendix, which is equivalent to Theorem 1:
Theorem 15. The quantum weak coin-flipping protocol
associated to an n-Coin-Game G by Protocol 1 satisfies:
P ∗A =
Ar
1−Hr , P
∗
B =
B2r
Hr , (A67)
and PA = 1−PB = 1−Hr, where A, B and H are defined
in terms of G by Eqs. (1,2).
The above result could be made more symmetric be-
tween Alice and Bob, if we were to redefine A and B
by
A(new)x =
{√Ax |x| even
Ax |x| odd
(A68)
B(new)x =
{
Bx |x| even√Bx |x| odd
(A69)
which could be computed bottom-up by a sequence of lin-
ear and root-mean-squared averages as in Ref. [1]. The
new definitions would also make the conserved quantities
such as Eqs. (A40,A57) have the same expression at even
and odd depths. However, the old definitions make man-
ifest the convexity that was exploited in the main sec-
tions of this paper, and therefore these definitions were
selected.
APPENDIX B: 0.192 REVISITED
In this section we shall derive an analytical expression
that corresponds to the bias of 0.192 found in Ref. [1].
Since the protocol with bias 0.192 has been superseded
by the results of the present work, we shall only sketch
the proof. Nonetheless, we hope that the techniques used
in deriving this expression, which are rather different to
the approach taken in the rest of the paper, will be of
use in some future applications.
The protocols that converged to a bias of 0.192 had
Coin-Games such that Gx = a|x|+1 for binary nodes. The
pattern of zeros and ones on the leaves was such that, at
each depth, the tree Ax only had two values which we
can call the high value and the low value. The high value
only got updated at even depths whereas the low value
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only got updated at odd depths. In particular, the value
of the root node could be calculated using the following
sequences: set Hn = 1 and Ln = 0 and define
Hk =
√
ak+1L2k+1 + (1− ak+1)H2k+1, (B1)
Lk = Lk+1, (B2)
for even k ≥ 0, and
Hk = Hk+1, (B3)
Lk = ak+1Hk+1 + (1− ak+1)Lk+1, (B4)
for odd k ≥ 0. The value of Ar is then given by H20 .
The sequence is defined so that H decreases and L
increases with decreasing k. At every step the condition
1 ≥ Hk ≥ Lk ≥ 0 holds. For good choices of ak the two
sequences will approach each other and H0 will be close
to L0.
A good sequence of parameters will also have ak small
for large k. For k small, ak can be larger as long as
ak(Hk − Lk) remains small. In such a case, we can use
the expansion
Hk ≃ Hk+1 − ak+1
H2k+1 − L2k+1
2Hk+1
, (B5)
for even k.
Furthermore, if ak is slowly varying, we can replace it
with a continuous function a(k), and the above compu-
tation can be approximated by the coupled differential
equations
dH
dk
=
a(k)
2
H2 − L2
2H
, (B6)
dL
dk
= −a(k)
2
(H − L), (B7)
where now H and L are treated as functions of the con-
tinuous variable k ∈ [0, n]. An extra factor of 1/2 was
picked up on the right hand side of the above equations
because H and L only get updated every other integer in
the discrete sequence.
Of course, we are only concerned with the convergence
point where H ≃ L. In the limit n → ∞, and for ap-
propriate a(k), the two expressions will converge to the
same point H0 = L0. To study the convergence point
we can study H as a function of L, which satisfies the
differential equation
dH
dL
= −H + L
2H
. (B8)
Surprisingly, the function a(k) drops out of the above
expression which means it only controls the rate of con-
vergence but not the final point of convergence (assuming
it satisfies the requirements discussed above). In essence,
much the same behavior can be observed by choosing dif-
ferent γn sequences for the protocol with bias 1/6 found
in the main section of this paper.
The differential equation is invariant under simultane-
ous rescaling of H and L, and therefore becomes separa-
ble under the change of variablesH → H/L. Its solutions
have the form
log
(
H2 +
1
2
LH +
1
2
L2
)
+
2√
7
arctan
√
7L
4H + L
= const.
(B9)
The initial condition for the differential equation is
H(L = 0) = 1, which corresponds to the initial start-
ing point when k → ∞. Applying the initial condition
we obtain const = 0. We are interested in the point
where H and L converge, that is, the value L0 such that
H(L0) = L0:
log 2L20 = −
2√
7
arctan
√
7
5
. (B10)
From this value we can obtain Ar = L20. When ak varies
slowly enough and meets our other requirements we also
get PA = 1/2 and therefore P
∗
A = 2L
2
0. These conditions
also guarantee that P ∗B = P
∗
A, hence
P ∗A = P
∗
B = Exp
[
− 2√
7
arctan
√
7
5
]
≃ 0.692181687, (B11)
which corresponds to the bias ǫ ≃ 0.192 from Ref. [1].
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